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I. INTRODUCTION
Be wary of the man who urges an action in which he himself
incurs no risk.'
-Giovachino Setanti
Corporate and individual investors alike seek to reduce their overall
risk of loss, or variability of projected outcomes, while maintaining an
optimal return on their portfolios. According to the capital asset pricing
mbdel,2 the total variability of any single investment is composed of
both systematic or market risk and unsystematic or diversifiable risk.
The latter, on the average, accounts for the higher proportion of total
variability.
Although an investor's control over the systematic risk of an invest-
ment is negligible, that same investor can control elements of unsys-
tematic risk. For those seeking to invest funds or resources in a foreign
state, political and jurisprudential uncertainty constitute elements of
unsystematic risk. Internal political actions within a foreign state may
range from those imposing minor contractual disputes needing a judicial
remedy to the extreme of confiscation or expropriation of property. The
legal remedies available to the investor may vary from country to country,
depending on the sophistication and integrity of local tribunals and
judicial systems.5 The degree of dispersion of an investor's risk widens
1. G. SETANTI, CENTELLAS DE VARIOS CONCEPTOS.
2. E.g., R. JOHNSON & R. MELICHER, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 417-18 (5th ed.
1982). The capital asset pricing model is a business model used to explain the relationship
between the risk of a project and its required return. The model contains an equation
which serves to explain this concept: E(Re) = Rf + [E(Rm) - Rf]Be. E(Re) represents
the expected return on investment in common stock or equity capital; Rf is the risk-free
rate; E(Rm) is the expected return in the market; and Be is the index of systematic risk
associated with the firm's stock. If an investment, based upon its risk level, fails to provide
a sufficient expected return, then an investor will not invest in that project. For example,
if government securities, with a risk level of zero, are providing a ten percent return,
then a business project with a risk level of one must provide a return higher than ten
percent. Otherwise, the risk averse investor will invest in the government securities.
3. Id. Systematic risk measures the extent to which a firm's operating or performance
measures covary or move with changes in measures of economic activity. Thus, systematic
risk cannot be eliminated by diversification.
4. Id. Unsystematic risk is not related to the market but, instead, to the individual
security. Thus, unsystematic risk may be diversified away.
5. N. DEAK & J. CELUSAK, INTERNATIONAL BANKING 173 (1984).
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with an increase in either the probability or severity of unfavorable
unsystematic events.6
Uncertainty over unsystematic actions may cause a private investor
to forsake investing in foreign markets. As a consequence, the investor
misses an opportunity for high return and diversification. In addition,
the foreign state must seek funds elsewhere, probably at a higher interest
rate, or sacrifice further development. If this scenario repeats itself
throughout the investing community, the international economic system
will be adversely impacted. Thus, it is not difficult to understand the
important role that potential political events and jurisprudential concerns
can play in any foreign investment decision.
Yet, a program exists which provides greater certainty in financial
transactions involving foreign states. For eligible participants, the In-
ternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) rem-
edies many of the problems caused by potential political or judicial
risk. ICSID provides an impartial international forum for the resolution
of disputes between foreign investors and host governments.7 This process
"'depoliticize[s]' the settlement of investment disputes and provide[s] a
climate of mutual confidence between investors and states favorable to
increasing the flow of resources to developing countries under reasonable
conditions."' The two methods of dispute resolution which ICSID uses
are arbitration and conciliation proceedings.
This Note first details the history and structure of ICSID. Next, it
explores ICSID's three jurisdictional requirements: personal jurisdiction,
consent, and subject matter jurisdiction. A discussion of the definition,
or lack thereof, of "investment" under the last element follows. The
Note then focuses on the intrinsic benefits of arbitration through ICSID.
Finally, the Note considers Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention,
which allows a contracting state to notify ICSID of a class of disputes
that it would not consider arbitrable.
II. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF ICSID
In the early 1960s, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank)9 laid the groundwork for ICSID in con-
6. W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 191 (2d
ed. 1986).
7. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S.
No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966), reprinted in 4 I.L.M.
532 (1965) [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
8. I. Shihata, Remarks at the Joint Conference on Resolving International Com-
mercial Disputes (Oct. 24, 1985), reprinted in NEWS FROM ICSID, Winter 1986, at 9.
9. N. DEAK & J. CELUSAK, supra note 5, at 258-59. The World Bank was established
in 1945. It is an international organization whose objective is to make or guarantee loans
for productive reconstruction or development projects. The Bank is organized along
corporate lines. Member nations hold all stock in the Bank and are eligible for loans.
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formity with the World Bank's objective of promoting and encouraging
private foreign investment. 0 First, the World Bank's General Counsel
prepared a Working Paper in the form of a Draft Convention." Legal
experts representing eighty-six different countries then met in the cities
of Addis Ababa (December 16-20, 1963), Santiago de Chile (February
3-7, 1964), Geneva (February 17-21, 1964), and Bangkok (April 27-
May 1, 1964). The questions and concerns expressed at these four
regional meetings led to the draft of the ICSID Convention. Subsequent
to its ratification by twenty countries, 12 the Convention entered into
force on October 14, 1966.
Since the effective date of the Convention, however, only twenty-five
cases have been brought before ICSID,13a number that barely outnum-
bers the years of its existence. ICSID's relatively recent establishment,
a lack of publicity, and the tendency of parties to settle amicably are
the primary reasons for the low number of cases brought pursuant to
the Convention. 4 The 1980s have witnessed an increase in the case load
of ICSID. Sixteen cases were submitted after 1981. Indeed, during
1988, the number of cases pending before ICSID peaked at eleven.
Two explanations for the increase this decade are that more and more
agreements now include reference to ICSID arbitration and that parties
have a more extensive case history from which to draw guidance.
While ICSID administers the arbitration and/or conciliation pro-
ceedings, it does not actually conduct them. This is left to the selected
Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal, whose membership con-
sists of persons from panels which ICSID maintains in accordance with
the Convention. If the parties are in agreement, they select any uneven
10. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S.
134, at art. I(ii).
11. Working Paper in the form of a Draft Convention (June 5, 1962), reprinted in
2 ICSID, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE CON-
VENTION 19 (1968).
12. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at art. 68(2).
13. Shihata, Introduction by the Secretary-General, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1988) [here-
inafter ICSID, 21ST ANN. REP.].
14. It takes time for parties to begin to utilize an ICSID arbitration or conciliation
clause within their international investment contracts and further time for a dispute to
arise between the parties.
Baker & Ryans, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 65, 69-70 (1976). This 1973 survey of international
vice-presidents or legal counsels of United States multinational companies found a general
lack of familiarity or utilization of ICSID. Out of 165 responses, only 26 firms indicated
that they were familiar with the Convention.
Baker, ICSID: An International Method for Handling Foreign Investment Disputes
in LDC's, FOREIGN TRADE REV. 490 (Jan.-Mar. 1987). This updated survey was distributed
to the Chief Financial Officers of United States multinational companies. Surprisingly,
even with the passage of time, a similar lack of knowledge of ICSID was indicated.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 4:1 1988]
number of conciliators or arbitrators. 5 If the parties are unable to agree,
the Convention sets the number of conciliators or arbitrators at three.
The parties appoint one arbitrator or conciliator each and then agree
on the third who serves as president. 16
The three official languages of ICSID are English, French, and
Spanish,I7 although parties thus far have only used the first two languages
in proceedings." According to the heading Procedural Languages in both
the Arbitration Rules and the Conciliation Rules, parties may use an
unofficial language if the Tribunal or Commission, after consulting with
the Secretary-General, gives its approval. 19
Once a majority decides an award, it becomes binding on the parties.20
By applying in writing to the Secretary-General, either party may later
have this award interpreted, 21 revised,2 2 or annulled, 23 through ICSID
procedures. These procedures are designed to ensure ICSID's self-
See also Rule 48(4), ICSID Basic Documents: Rules of Procedure for Arbitration
Proceedings, ICSID Doc./15 (1985). Rule 48(4), entitled Rendering of the Award,
contributes to the lack of general knowledge of ICSID: "The Centre shall not publish
the award without the consent of the parties. The Centre may, however, include in its
publications excerpts of the legal rules applied by the Tribunal." Recent efforts helping
to promote the facilities of the Centre include attendance at conferences and seminars
by the Secretariat and publication of ICSID REVIEW - FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW
JOURNAL.
15. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at arts. 29(2)(a) & 37(2)(a).
16. Id. at arts. 29(2)(b) & 37(2)(b).
17. Regulation 34, ICSID Basic Documents: Administrative and Financial Regula-
tions, ICSID Doc./15 (1985).
18. NEWS FROM ICSID, Winter 1988, at 6.
19. Rule 22, ICSID Basic Documents: Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceed-
ings, ICSID Doc./15 (1985); Rule 21, ICSID Basic Documents: Rules of Procedure for
Conciliation Proceedings, ICSID Doc./15 (1985).
20. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at art. 53.
21. Id. at art. 50(1). "If any dispute shall arise between the parties as to the meaning
or scope of an award .... "' Id.
22. Article 51(1) reads as follows:
Either party may request revision of the award . . . on the ground of discovery
of some fact of such nature as decisively to affect the award, provided that when
the award was rendered that fact was unknown to the Tribunal and to the applicant
and that the applicant's ignorance of that fact was not due to negligence.
Id. at art. 51(1).
23. Id. at art. 52(1).
Either party may request annulment of the award.., on one or more of the
following grounds:
(a) that the tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure;
or
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.
Id.
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contained operation and its autonomy. Additionally, national courts of
each Contracting State must recognize and enforce such an award as
if it were a final judgment of a court in that state. 24
Although ICSID is an autonomous organization, it still has close ties
with the World Bank, as evidenced by its finances,25 its leadership, 26
and its seat, located at the principal office of the World Bank in
Washington, D.C.27
III. JURISDICTION
Article 25(1) of the Convention sets forth ICSID's jurisdiction:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any con-
stituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the
Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which
the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.
When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its
consent unilaterally. 8
Thus, three prerequisites-personal jurisdiction, consent of the parties,
and subject matter jurisdiction-must be satisfied before ICSID has
proper jurisdiction.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
ICSID's personal jurisdiction requirement restricts the parties eligible
for dispute resolution to a Contracting State and a foreign investor.
Consequently, the reach of ICSID's jurisdictional arm does not extend
24. Id. at art. 54(1).
25. Report and Financial Statements, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETrELMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 13, 17, 18. According to the ar-
rangement between the World Bank and ICSID, ICSID does not have any resources of
its own. The World Bank provides ICSID with the services of staff members and consultants
plus other administrative services and facilities, such as travel, communications, office
accommodations, furniture, equipment, supplies, and printing. These expenditures do not
include any reimbursement of fees and expenses by the parties to arbitration or conciliation
and, also, are offset by reimbursements by ICSID from sale of publications and registration
fees.
26. Res. No. Ac(17)/Res/55 of ICSID's Administrative Council (on the election of
the Secretary-General); Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Invest-
ment. The Role of the World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and Miga, 1
AM. U.J. INTrL L. & POL'Y 97, 101 (1986).
27. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at art. 2. ICSID's address and phone number
are as follows:
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433
U.S.A.
(202) 477-1234
28. Id. at art. 25(1).
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to investment disputes between Contracting States, between individual
investors, or between a Contracting State and one of its nationals.29
The Convention is open for signature on behalf of any state which
is a member of the Bank.30 Also, the Administrative Council, by a two-
thirds vote, can invite any state which is a party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice to sign the Convention. 31 As of June 1988,
ninety-seven states have become signatories to the Convention, 32 and
eighty-nine have ratified it.33 Furthermore, six states have designated
constituent subdivisions or agencies as competent to become parties to
submitted disputes.34 ICSID can thus boast not only a wide and diverse
29. Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction Ratione Personae under the Convention on the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 1974-1975
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 227, 229. The limited scope of personal jurisdiction can be explained.
"Disputes between private individuals can be settled through municipal systems of law.
Disputes between States and their own nationals fall outside the scope of an international
convention intended to deal with foreign investment. Disputes between States may be
settled under traditional international law." Id.
30. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at art. 67.
31. Id.
32. List of Contracting States and Signatories of the Convention (as of June 30,
1988), ICSID, 21sT ANN. REP. 6 (1988). The following is a regional breakdown of
contracting states:
Africa - People's Republic of Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ca-
meroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, People's Republic of the Congo,
C8te d'Ivorie, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia,
Uganda, Zaire, Zambia;
Asia - Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Japan, Republic of Korea, Nepal, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka;
Western Europe - Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic
of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland;
Eastern Europe - Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia;
Southern Pacific - Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Western Samoa;
North America - United States of America;
Central America & Caribbean - Barbados, El Salvador, Jamaica, St. Lucia,
Trinidad and Tobago;
South America - Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay; and,
Middle East - Arab Republic of Egypt, Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates.
33. Id. at 14-15. Those states who have signed the ICSID Convention but have not
yet ratified it are Australia, Belize, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, Thailand, and
Turkey. The ICSID provisions are not in force without ratification.
34. Measures Taken by Contracting States for the Purpose of the Convention:
Designation by Contracting States of Constituent Subdivisions or Agencies, ICSID Doc./
8-B (1987). On May 7, 1968, the United Kingdom became the first Contracting State
to designate to ICSID under Article 25(1). The list of its constituent subdivisions or
agencies is as follows: Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands
(Malvinas), Falkland Island (Malvinas) Dependencies, Gilbraltar. Hong Kong, Montserrat,
112
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membership, but also the largest number of signatories of any inter-
national arbitration treaty.35
The Convention defines the term "national of another Contracting
State" to mean any natural or judicial person.36 A corporation qualifies
as a judicial person and is considered a national of the state in which
it is incorporated or where its headquarters are situated. Under the
Convention, however, the parties may agree to treat any judicial person
under foreign control which has the nationality of the Contracting State
party as a national of another Contracting State.37
B. Consent
Consent is governed by two requirements. First, consent must exist
by the time ICSID is seized, and second, it must be in writing. The
term "seized" means "to endow (a governmental agency of deliberative
body [ICSID]) with the responsibility for action on a matter by placing
it on an agenda.'38 The parties need not express their consent in a
single instrument.39 A bilateral investment protection agreement with
the investor's home state40 or national investment legislation 4' may contain
a host state's consent or it may be given consent compromis. 42 Unless
otherwise agreed, the consent of the parties to ICSID renders arbitration
the exclusive remedy. As a condition of its consent, however, a Con-
Anguila, St. Helena, St. Helena Dependencies, Turks & Caicos Islands, and Guernsey
(Bailiwick of).
The other five Contracting States and their respective constituent subdivision or agency
are the following: Nigeria & NNPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation), Mada-
gascar & AKORAMA (Enterprise Nationale d'Hydrocarbure), Sudan & The General
Petroleum Corporation, Guinea & MIFERGUI-NIMBA (Societe des Mines de Fer de
Guinee pour l'Exploitation des Monts Nimba), and Portugal & Foreign Investment Institute.
35. Broches, Settlement of Disputes Arising Out of Investment in Developing Coun-
tries, 11 INT'L Bus. L. 206, 208 (1983); NEWS FROM ICSID, Summer 1988, at 2. The
number of states which have either ratified or acceded to the 1958 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) is
seventy-seven.
36. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at art. 25(2).
37. Id. at art. 25(2)(b). See Holiday Inns v. Morocco, Case ARB/72/1; AMCO Asia
v. Indonesia, Case ARB/81/1; NEWS FROM ICSID, Summer 1985, at 3-6.
38. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2057 (1961).
39. Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 524, 527 1 24 (1965).
40. NEWS FROM ICSID, Winter 1987, at 6. Currently there are at least 108 bilateral
investment treaties containing such references to ICSID. Treaties can be found in the
Centre's collection of INVESTMENT TREATIES.
41. Id. These laws are included in the ICSID collection, INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE
WORLD.
42. Compromis is defined as "a formal agreement between nations submitting a
dispute to arbitration and defining the terms of the submission, the powers of the tribunal
to serve as arbitrator, and the procedure to be followed." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 467 (1961).
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tracting State may require the other party to exhaust local administrative
and judicial remedies.43 All potential investors should be aware that
Israel, currently the only state to do so, has elected this option. 44
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As the ICSID Convention matured during the drafting process, it
shed, like a snake's skin, the structural definition of an "investment."
In Article IV, Section 1(3) of the Working Paper in the form of a
Draft Convention, the initial rough draft of the ICSID Convention,
subject matter jurisdiction was limited to claims of $100,000 or more
United States dollars, unless the parties agreed otherwise. 45 The writers
of the next draft, the Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
excluded any monetary limit. They believed that important questions
of principle might not qualify under this limit or that the pecuniary
value of an investment in dispute may not be ascertainable. 46 "Invest-
ment" was defined in a subsequent draft to be "any contribution of
money or other asset of economic value for an indefinite period or, if
the period be defined, for not less than five years. '47
The ICSID Convention, in its final form, however, has omitted this
definition for fear that a concrete meaning would limit its scope48 and
raise unnecessary jurisdictional problems. Consequently, parties to an
agreement are free to define the terms between themselves. As a result
of this intentional omission, the phrase from Article 25(1), "any legal
dispute arising out of an investment," provides the complete basis for
all ICSID jurisdiction. The words "legal dispute" limit ICSID's juris-
diction to justiciable disputes involving the existence or scope of a legal
right or obligation, 49 such as non-performance, violation of "stabilization"
43. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at art. 26.
44. Measures Taken by Contracting States for the Purpose of the Convention:
Notification Concerning Classes of Disputes Considered Suitable or Unsuitable for Sub-
mission to the Centre, ICSID Doc./8-C (1987).
45. Working Paper in the form of a Draft Convention (June 5, 1962), reprinted in
2 ICSID, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE CON-
VENTION 19, 34 (1968).
46. Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, comment to art. II (Oct. 15, 1963),
reprinted in 2 ICSID, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION
OF THE CONVENTION 184, 204 (1968).
47. Draft Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 30 (Sept. 11, 1964), reprinted in 2 ICSID, DOCUMENTS
CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION 610, 623 (1968).
48. Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States 9 (Mar. 18, 1965)
reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION 1069, 1078 (1968).
49. Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction
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clauses, the interpretation of the agreement, and related issues of
compensation.5
Because the Convention leaves open the question of "investment,"
the parties are free to define it in either traditional or non-traditional
terms. Traditional forms of investment have included concessions, es-
tablishment agreements, joint ventures, loans made by private financial
institutions to foreign public entities, and arrangements concerning in-
dustrial property rights. Agreements which have become the subject of
disputes include the following: () the exploitation of natural resources,
such as bauxite mining," oil exploitation and exploration,52 and forestry
exploitation;53 (ii) industrial investments regarding the production of
fibers for exports,54 or of plastic bottles for domestic consumption,55
liquefaction of natural gas, 5 6 and the production of aluminum;57 and, (iii)
tourism development in the form of construction of hotels, 8 and urban
development in the form of housing construction.5 9
Non-traditional forms of investment have included profit-sharing,
service and management contracts, contracts for the sale and erection
of industrial plants, turn-key contracts, international leasing, arrange-
ments and agreements for the transfer of know-how and technology.
Illustrations of non-traditional investment include the construction of a
chemical plant on a turn-key basis coupled with a management contract
providing technical assistance for the operation of the plant, 60 a man-
agement contract for the operation of a cotton mill,6' a contract for the
and Development on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 524, 528 % 26 (1965).
50. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration: Practical Considerations, 1 J. INTL ARB. 101, 116-
17 (1984).
51. Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica/Kaiser Bauxite Company/Reynolds Jamaica Mines
and Reynolds Metals Company v. Jamaica, Cases ARB/74/2, 3 & 4.
52. AGIP S.P.A. v. People's Republic of the Congo, Case ARB/77/1; Tesoro Pe-
troleum Corp. v. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Case CONC/83/1.
53. Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. (LETCO) v. The Government of the Republic
of Liberia, Case ARB/83/2.
54. Adriano Gardella SpA v. Government of Ivory Coast, Case ARB/74/1.
55. Socit6 Ltd. Benvenuti & Bonfant srl. v. People's Republic of the Congo, Case
ARB/77/2.
56. Guadalupe v. Nigeria, Case ARB/78/1.
57. Swiss Aluminium Ltd. (ALUSUISSE) and Icelandic Aluminium Company Ltd.
(ISAL) v. The Government of Iceland, Case ARB/83/l.
58. Holiday Inns/Occidental Petroleum v. The Government of Morocco, Case ARB/
72/1; AMCO Asia Corp., Pan American Development Ltd. and P.T. Indonesia v. Indonesia,
Case ARB/81/1.
59. Soci~t6 Quest Africaine des B6tons Industriels (SOABI) v. The State of S6n6gal,
Case ARB/82/I.
60. KLOCKNER Industrie Anlagen GmbH v. The United Rebublic of Cameroon
and Societe Camerounaise des Engrais (SOCAME), Case ARB/81/2.
61. SEDITEX Engineering Beratungsgesellschaft fur die Textilindustrie m.b.H. v.
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, Case CONC/82/1.
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conversion of vessels into fishing vessels and the training of crews,62 and
technical and licensing agreements for the manufacturing of weapons. 63
Consequently, ICSID participants have embraced the notion that an
investment can be in any form agreed upon by the parties. No party
has objected that the transaction out of which the dispute arose was
not an "investment" for the purposes of the Convention.
Yet, the definition, or lack thereof, does have its drawbacks. One
commentator believes that when the parties have the power to define
the terms, the party with the higher bargaining power will succeed. 64
This defeats the Convention's goal of treating the parties equally. Another
commentator has stated that the terms "legal dispute," "directly," and
"investment" are all sufficiently controversial to call for definitions in
an interpretative section. 65
The precise nature of transactions relating to the supply of services
may fall into a grey area between investment proper and commercial
ventures. To avoid future controversy, ICSID recommends that the
parties follow Model Clauses (section 2, paragraph 7).66 This encourages
parties to "state expressly in the instrument recording their consent that
the particular transaction between them constitutes an investment for
the purposes of the Convention. ' 67 Additionally, ICSID advises that the
parties supplement the provision with a description of the particular
features of the investment, such as its nature, size, and duration.68 If
an investment agreement containing an ICSID arbitration clause is
intimately related to other arrangements not covered by ICSID, the
Convention suggests that the parties provide for ad hoc arbitration
62. Atlantic Triton Company Ltd. v. The Republic of Guinea, Case ARB/84/1.
63. Colt Industries Operating Corp., Firearms Div. v. The Government of the Republic
of Korea, Case ARB/84/2.
64. Gopal, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 591, 599 (1982).
65. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 142
(1969).
66. Model Clauses Recording Consent to the Jurisdiction of the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Doc./5 (1981).
67. Id.
68. NEWS FROM ICSID, Summer 1984, at 18.
69. Id. at 14.
70. While ICSID is available for conciliation, all but two of the twenty-four cases
have dealt with arbitration. As a result, this Note will emphasize arbitration. However,
much of what is examined concerning arbitration under ICSID is likewise applicable to
conciliation.
71. See Paulsson, Third World Participation in International Investment Arbitration,
2 ICSID REv.-FILJ 19, 63-64 (1987).
72. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at arts. 37(2), 38 & 39. Delaume, ICSID
Arbitration Proceedings, 4 INrL TAX & Bus. LAw. 218, 220 (1986).
73. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration Proceedings: Practical Aspects, 5 PACE L. REV.
563, 575 n.44 (1985).
74. See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, FIF-
TEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 30-43 (1982). But see Gopal, supra, note 63, at 594. Gopal
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incorporating, to the extent necessary, the ICSID rules and designating
the Secretary-General as appointing authority.
69
IV. BENEFITS OF ICSID ARBITRATION
Having established eligible parties for dispute resolution as outlined
under the terms of the Convention, another query arises naturally. Why
should a party choose ICSID for its arbitration proceedings? 0 For the
investor, the answer is receiving a host state's irrevocable consent and
the right to a binding dispute resolution, thereby avoiding litigation in
that host state's courts. For the host state, the motivation is enhanced
global reputation. This leads to a greater likelihood of investment for
de.velopment due to investor confidence in receiving an impartial hearing.
Moreover, contract prices should be lower because investors will not
need to factor in the "legal risk premium" associated with a foreign
judiciary.7' Arbitration allows for a unique solution to the parties' par-
ticular problem; consequently, a successful relationship can continue
unimpeded. In addition, selection of arbitrators is left completely to the
parties, with only a few minor requirements.
7 2
For both parties, arbitration is advantageous because it is relatively
fast, inexpensive, and flexible. The average length of time for either a
final award or a party settlement under ICSID is approximately two
and one-half 3 to three years. 74 ICSID has recently introduced a pre-
hearing conference to shorten this time period further.75 ICSID's fee is
based on the actual costs which its subsidized staff incurs rather than
the ad valorem or "percentage of the total amount in dispute" system
which the International Chamber of Commerce uses.7 6 Also, ICSID
argues that to a party, especially an investor whose capital is frozen, three years is a
long period of time.
75. Rule 21, ICSID Basic Documents: Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings,
ICSID Doc./15 (1985). Under Rule 21, a pre-hearing conference between the Tribunal
and the parties may be held where information may be exchanged, uncontested facts
stipulated, and/or issues considered in dispute.
76. Soley, ICSID Implementatior An Effective Alternative to International Conflict,
19 INrL LAw. 521, 524 (1985); Shihata, Introduction by the Secretary-General, INTER-
NATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPUTES, NINETEENTH ANNUAL RE-
PORT 4 (1986). Secretary-General Shihata noted that ICSID arbitration, while cheaper
than that of other institutions, can be expensive. Costs usually exceed $100,000 (not
counting the fees of counsel for the parties).
See also Delaume, The ICSID and the Banker, INTL FIN. L. ReV. 9, 12 (1983);
Insert in ICSID Basic Documents, ICSID Doc./15 (1985). A $100 non-refundable reg-
istration fee is required at the time of submission of an arbitration or conciliation request.
The administrative expenses include the following: (1) $250 per day for the time spent
by the Secretary assigned to a Tribunal of Committee, (2) travel and subsistence expenses
of the Secretary, and (3) cost of interpreters, reporters, and rental space. The arbitrators
and conciliators' fees are set at Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 600 per eight hour day,
plus travel and subsistence expenses. SDR are based on exchange rates for the U.S.,
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requests advance payments only to cover expected expenditures for
periods of three to six months, whereas other dispute resolution insti-
tutions normally require an advance payment to cover full administrative
charges."
V. ARTICLE 25(4)
A. Notification by Contracting States
ICSID's acceptance by various states is directly attributable to the
articles of its Convention. These articles satisfy the needs of both
developed and less developed countries, thus allowing ICSID to reach
its present level of membership. Article 25(4) is a good illustration.
Under its provisions, "[a]ny Contracting State may, at the time of
ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or at any time
thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which
it would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the
Centre."T'The Secretary-General must then inform all Contracting States
of the notification. 79 Currently, only the following four states have such
notification: Jamaica, Saudi Arabia, Papua New Guinea, and Israel8 0
Jamaica, the first to use Article 25(4), excluded any disputes "arising
directly out of an investment relating to minerals or other natural
resources."'" Papua New Guinea has specified that "it will only consider
submitting those disputes to the Centre which are fundamental to the
investment itself." 82 Saudi Arabia "reserve[d] the right of not submitting
all questions pertaining to oil and pertaining to acts of sovereignty" to
ICSID.13 Israel has declared that it "shall consider submitting to the
Centre only disputes related to an approved investment under one of
the Israeli Laws for the Encouragement of Capital Investments. '5 4
Guyana did have a notification similar to Jamaica's until recently.85 It
notified the Secretariat of the Centre on October 23, 1987, however,
that upon careful reconsideration of the matter, it "has decided to
West German, British, French, and Japanese currencies. With the U.S. dollar equivalent
of the SDR at 1.3, these fees are approximately $780.
77. Insert in ICSID Basic Documents, ICSID Doc./15 (Jan. 1985).
78. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at art. 25(4).
79. Id.
80. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles
of ICSID and Miga, 1 ICSID REv.-FILJ 1, 5:5 (1986).
81. Measures Taken by Contracting States for the Purpose of the Convention, supra
note 44. Notification on May 8, 1974.
82. Id. Notification on Sept. 14, 1978.
83. Id. Notification on May 8, 1980.
84. Id. Notification on June 22, 1983.
85. Id. Notification on July 8, 1974.
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withdraw the . . . notification and hereby does so."18 6 This notification
stated that "[h]ereafter the Government of Guyana will, in accordance
with Article 25 of the said Convention, refer to the Centre legal disputes
to which that Article applies and which the parties to the dispute consent
in writing to submit to the Centre. 8 s7
B. Interpretation of Article
The landmark case in the area of notification is Alcoa Minerals of
Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica.88 In 1968, Alcoa Minerals of
Jamaica, Inc. (Alcoa), an American corporation, agreed to construct an
alumina refining plant in Jamaica. 9 In return, the government granted
the corporation tax concessions and long-term leases for the mining of
bauxite.90 Six years later, Jamaica imposed new taxes.91 Alcoa then
sought arbitration pursuant to the ICSID arbitration clause of its agree-
ment with the government. This clause provided that ICSID would
arbitrate any disputes which the parties failed to settle amicably. Ja-
maica, however, had notified ICSID earlier that year that this class of
dispute would not be subject to jurisdiction. Deeming this notification
to work both prospectively and retrospectively, the government refused
to appear at arbitration, considering the matter not subject to ICSID
arbitration.9 2 The arbitration tribunal ruled that notification can only
operate prospectively 9 and that the initial consent of Jamaica was
unconditional and unqualified. Thus, according to the ICSID Convention,
consent could not be unilaterally withdrawn. Because the terms of a
written consent already in effect cannot be altered by Article 25(4),
Georges R. Delaume, former Senior Legal Advisor of ICSID, has
suggested that "care should be taken to draft the consent clause only
as broadly as the parties intend the eventual scope of ICSID authority
to be."'9 4
86. NENvs FROM ICSID, Winter 1988, at 10. But see Measures Taken by Contracting
States for the Purpose of the Convention, supra note 44, which states that Guyana on
Sept. 29, 1987 notified ICSID of its withdrawal of its earlier notification.
87. Measures Taken by Contracting States for the Purpose of the Convention, supra
note 44. On October 30, 1987, one week after Guyana's notification, ICSID fulfilled the
requirement of transmitting it to all Contracting States as set forth in Article 25(4)'s
second sentence.
88. Case ARB/74/2.
89. For a thorough discussion of this case, see Schmidt, Arbitration under the Auspices
of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Implications
of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of
Jamaica, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 90, 93 (1976).
90. Id. at 93.
91. Id. at 94.
92. Id. at 95.
93. Id. at 103.
94. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration in Practice, 2 INTL TAX & Bus. LAW. 58, 61
(1984).
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The Alcoa ruling, therefore, shields investors who have contracted
from any subsequent change in a country's consent to the jurisdiction
of ICSID. Yet even with this protection, nationals of another Contracting
State, when considering upcoming investment options, must remain alert
to any possible future notification.
C. Value of Article
In light of Guyana's recent withdrawal of its previous notification,
a review of the purpose and usefulness of Article 25(4) is timely. A
key attribute of this article is its flexibility for states. As discussed
earlier, the definition of "investment" is not static. Under Article 25(4),
if the current interpretation of "investment" does not fit a state's needs,
the state can elect to have a class of disputes eliminated from ICSID
jurisdiction. Furthermore, even though a Contracting State has notified
ICSID, this does not preclude it from subsequently consenting on an
ad hoc basis to ICSID arbitration on that subject.95
Is Article 25(4) necessary? Few states use it; only five out of a
possible eighty-nine states have elected to notify ICSID during its twenty-.
two year existence. Nor has any state used it recently; over five years
have elapsed since any Contracting State has notified ICSID of in-
vestments it would not consider submitting to ICSID's jurisdiction.
Perhaps the other states are not aware of the provision; this is unlikely,
however, considering that the states, as signatories, presumably know
the Convention's contents. Additionally, the Secretary-General informs
every state of any Article 25(4) notification.
Alternatively, the Contracting States may truly have no need, now
or in the future, for the article. If this is true, Article 25(4) may be a
superfluous appendage to the ICSID Convention. If desired, a sole
Contracting State may propose an amendment to the Convention seeking
to have the article repealed.9 6 Article 66(1) requires the Administrative
Council to then vote on the proposed amendment.97 The Administrative
Council is composed of one representative from each Contracting State.98
Proposed amendments require a two-thirds majority before they can be
circulated for ratification, acceptance, or approval by the Contracting
States.99
Support for amending the Convention may be found by examining
the class or classes of disputes which these states have deemed unsuitable
95. Tupman, Case Studies in the Jurisdiction of the International Centre for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes, 35 INTL & COMP. L.Q. 813, 816 n.17 (1986).
96. ICSID Convention, supra note 7, at art. 65.
97. Id. at art. 66.
98. Id. at art. 4(1).
99. Id. at art. 66(1).
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ICSID
for ICSID arbitration. Both Jamaica and Saudi Arabia exclude natural
resources, a traditional form of investment. As today's forms of invest-
ment broaden in scope, the emphasis given to natural resources will
undoubtedly lessen.
For those states favoring the repeal of Article 25(4), a potentially
insurmountable problem arises. Article 66(1) mandates that all Con-
tracting States must ratify, accept, or approve the amendment before
it can enter into force. 00 Understandably, Jamaica, Saudi Arabia, Papua
New Guinea, or Israel may be wary of any change in the status quo.
Nevertheless, Article 66(2) provides that "no amendment shall affect
the rights and obligations under this Convention of any Contracting
State . . .arising out of consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre given
before the date of entry into force of the amendment."' 0 1 Still, having
Conventional Amendments which require the highest threshold possible
effectively eliminates amending all but the least controversial elements.
Correctional evolution must come from elsewhere.
Finally, Contracting States may know about the provision and may
approve of it, although they currently have no need for it. The world
market may dictate that a Contracting State acquiesce to the policies
of investors in order to compete for development funds. If conditions
vacillate, however, a Contracting State may acquire the leverage over
investors to selectively exclude investments of its own choice. Regardless
of the business environment, a nation rarely relinquishes its sovereignty
without receiving something in exchange. Clearly, if Article 25(4) were
to be eliminated, investors would gain all and sacrifice nothing. Fur-
thermore, loss of notification would serve as a disincentive for those
states considering membership in ICSID.
VI. CONCLUSION
While ICSID cannot eliminate political risk, it has proven to be an
effective means for arbitrating a select group of disputes that arise as
a result of such risk. By limiting the class of participants and the subject
matter to which it applies, it fills a niche not stressed by other inter-
national dispute resolution forums. With an ever increasing case load
and heightened publicity, ICSID stands to become more widely utilized
in the next decade.
As discussed above, the subject matter jurisdiction of ICSID is
flexible. The parties themselves control the meaning to be given the
term "investment," a power restricted only by their own resourcefulness.
100. Id.
101. Id. at art. 66(2).
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Article 25(4), however, impedes this open construction. Yet, given the
realities of the Contracting State/investor relationship, notification will
likely remain. To the investor, ICSID acts as insurance which minimizes
the risk of foreign investment. To the Contracting State, Article 25(4)
is likewise a form of insurance which guards that nation's sovereignty.
Under the Convention, Contracting States have the right to amend
their consent to ICSID jurisdiction. Under the Convention, Contracting
States also have the right to amend the Convention itself. Neither of
these rights should be exercised lightly. Both Contracting States and
investors should, however, be aware that these options, while not always
viable, do exist.
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